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A light drizzle fell on Thursday, April 23, 1970, as eight hundred protestors chanted
outside Yale University’s Sprague Hall. Their voices carried into the building, where Yale’s
faculty gathered for an unprecedented meeting. The question to be decided: Would the university
shut down, “striking,” to show solidarity with Bobby Seale, the national leader of the Black
Panthers then on trial for conspiracy to commit murder a few blocks away in New Haven’s court
house? In the days before and after April 23, twelve thousand demonstrators flocked to the Elm
City to participate in a rally supporting Seale on “May Day.” The threat of violence loomed over
the faculty’s proceedings. Some vocal radicals vowed to “free Bobby” and “burn Yale.” The
more moderate simply demanded that the university strike.1
In this moment of tension, Yale president Kingman Brewster addressed the assembled
faculty. Under no circumstances should the university itself close, though students should be free
to not attend classes. Nor, according to Brewster, would the institution take an official position
on the Seale trial. Then, in front of the assembled dons of Yale, he uttered a line that ignited a
media firestorm — a line so famous the New York Times would highlight it in his obituary.2
Though the university must remain neutral, Brewster himself was skeptical that a black
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This essay was originally submitted in the spring of 2013. When I initially placed it online in 2014, I fixed a few
typos present in that first version. In the fall of 2014, I wrote an article about the Woodward Report for the Yale
Alumni Magazine’s January/February 2015 issue. In the course of writing that article, I further corrected a few
errors, which have all been noted with footnotes marked with asterisks instead of numbers. I owe a debt to
Geoffrey Kabaservice for spotting what might have been the most egregious error: my misspelling of his name, in
parts, for which I apologize.
1
On the faculty meeting, see: Michael Sherman, “Academic Requirements Left Up to Individual Discretion,” Yale
Daily News, April 24, 1970, 1. On the events surrounding May Day in general, see: Paul Bass and Douglas Rae,
Murder in the Model City (New York: Basic Books, 2006). For a history-cum-memoir written immediately
following the events, see: John Hersey, Letter to the Alumni (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970). See also, Jon Taft,
Mayday at Yale: A Case Study in Student Radicalism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976). Also see, Geoffrey
Kavaservice, The Guardians: Kingman Brewster, His Circle, and The Rise of The Liberal Establishment (New
York: Henry and Holt, 2004), 402-457.
2
Eric Pace, “Kingman Brewster J., 69, Ex-Yale President and U.S. Envoy, Dies,” The New York Times, November
9, 1988, D29.
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revolutionary could receive a “fair trial anywhere in the United States.”3 A year later, in an
interview, professor of classics Donald Kagan classified that speech as “classically Brewster.”
Yale’s head of state simultaneously appealed to conservative and liberal wings of the faculty —
the former with his vow to maintain academic functions in the midst of chaos, the latter with his
condemnation of the American legal system.4
As Kagan suggested, occupying opposing ends of the ideological spectrum had become
commonplace for Brewster throughout his tenure at Yale, which began in 1963. Born to a
patrician New England family, Kingman Brewster had graduated from Yale College in 1941 and
soon after joined the Navy at the onset of World War Two. When peace came, he earned his
LL.B. and entered the world of academia as a Harvard law professor. Tapped as Yale’s provost
in 1960, he became president three years later, just as Yale and the nation entered the turbulent
waters of the 1960s — a cultural sea on which raged the storms of student unrest, civil rights,
and Vietnam. In the coming decade, he would become a national figure, gracing the covers of
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This account of Brewster’s speech relies on an oral history interview with Donald Kagan, conducted in 1971.
Donald Kagan, interview by Brooke Manville, transcript, April 27, 1971, May Day Rally and Yale Collection (RU
86), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Accession 1983-A-108, Box 1, Folder 6. The full content
of Brewster’s speech is a matter of historical debate. Most accounts, including those by Bass, Hersey and
Kabaservice, only cite the portion of Brewster’s speech regarding the ability of a black man to receive a fair trial in
the United States. These histories quote an edited statement released by the university to the press on April 24,
which purported to be the entirety of Brewster’s speech to the faculty and was intended to clarify Brewster’s more
controversial comments. However, that statement does not include Brewster’s commitment that the university
remain open — a comment that has, until now, been overlooked. Hersey, for instance, prints the press release as if it
were Brewster’s complete speech. Hersey, Letter to the Alumni, 87-8. For a copy of that press release, see: Remarks
of President Kingman Brewster at Yale College Faculty meeting, April 23, 1970, May Day Rally and Yale
Collection, Accession 1971-A-004, Box 2, Folder “Statements, Releases, etc. by Kingman Brewster.” A single copy
of Brewster’s full speech survives today in his presidential archives. It differs slightly from Kagan’s account. In that
version, Brewster ended, instead of began, his speech with a defense of the university remaining opening. However,
there is no indication that the archived document is the final draft of Brewster’s speech. See: Statement by Kingman
Brewster, Jr. at meeting of the Faculty of Yale College April 23, 1970, Office of the President, Yale University,
Records Concerning the May Day Rally (RU 16), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Accession
1983-A-108, Box 1, Folder 6. When interviewed, Brewster’s aide who helped write the speech, Henry “Sam”
Chauncey, Jr., vaguely remembered Kagan’s version of events. Henry “Sam” Chauncey, Jr., interview by author,
electronic recording, February 14, 2013.
4
Donald Kagan, interview by Brooke Manville, April 27, 1971. After extensive debate, the Yale College faculty did
vote to “modify“ normal academic expectations.
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Time and Newsweek, serving on presidential commissions, and symbolizing the face of American
academia.5
Yale’s new president governed pragmatically, choosing to champion causes that served
the political necessities of the moment.6 A lifelong sailor, Brewster once compared academic
administration to his maritime pastime. 7 In a way, as a president he resembled a captain who
tacked to the right or to the left as needed in the face of heavy winds. According to one of his
colleagues, Brewster “was not going to take any unbending positions, ideologically or
philosophically… He managed Tuesday when Tuesday came, and he managed Wednesday when
Wednesday came.”8
Over the course of the 1960s, two issues in particular, the campaign to coeducate Yale
and the university’s response to student disruption, highlight Brewster’s pragmatic approach to
governance. Beginning in the mid-1960s, Yale began the process that would culminate with the
admission of women in 1969. Mindful that some alumni opposed female students on campus and
that he needed those alumni’s support, Brewster approached a shift in gender policy with
extreme reluctance. When others pressed for women in the classroom, he first advocated a
partnership with Vassar, an all-women’s college in upstate New York. When that plan failed, he
proposed building a separate female-only institution in New Haven, rather than transform the allboys-club that was Yale College. And when the possibility of coeducation became increasingly
realistic, he developed a signature catch phrase to satisfy the more chauvinistic alumni:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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On Brewster’s life and prominence in American politics, see Geoffrey Kabaservice’s The Guardians, the closest
work that exists to a biography of Brewster.
6
In seeing Brewster as a pragmatist, I am influenced by Kabaservice’s The Guardians, and John Thelin, A History
of American Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 313.
7
R. Thomas Herman, “The Inscrutable King of Yale,” (draft article for Harper’s, never published, August 9, 1968),
Speeches and Articles by and about Presidents of Yale University (RU 65), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale
University Library, Accession 1988-A-056, Box 2, Folder 47.
8
William Kessen, interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, June 2, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History
Project, Yale University (RU 217), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Box 6, Folder 82.
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Regardless of the acceptance of women, Yale would always produce “one thousand male leaders
a year.” Faced with pleasing those Yale graduates opposed to coeducation, Brewster tacked to
the right, vowing to preserve a significant majority of men at Yale.
In contrast to his conservatism with regards to women in academia, Brewster often
acquiesced to the confrontational tactics of the 1960s New Left. When the local black
community threatened violence if Yale allowed Governor George Wallace, a controversial
segregationist, to speak on its campus in 1963, Brewster pressured students to disinvite their
guest. When undergraduates forcibly occupied administrative offices in 1969, officials acceded
to their demands. These events —indicative of disruption on university and college campuses
across America — threatened Yale’s safety. Brewster diffused the hazards of rebellion by
pragmatically modifying commitments to civility, discipline and the values of free speech.
May Day 1970 represented the height of Brewster’s political realism, as his speech
combined appeals to academic conservatism with progressive social justice to appease multiple
factions within the Yale faculty. After May Day, the climactic storm of the 1960s slowly
subsided; in the words of one Yale administrator, “the steam let out.”9!The university and
America found itself entering a decade of calmer waters. For Brewster, his pragmatism had led
him to two simultaneous extremes on either end of the ideological spectrum. His earlier position
against coeducation and his leniency towards student disruption, once politically expedient, had
become embarrassing liabilities.
The peacefulness of the 1970s provided an opportunity for Brewster to moderate his
stances on both issues, and, in doing so, reshape his university. Two carefully-designed Yale
faculty committees became the vehicles for that change. Chaired by the eminent political
scientist Robert Dahl, the first committee endorsed admitting an equal number of men and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chauncey, interview by author, February 14, 2013.
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women in 1972. In doing so, Dahl and his colleagues provided Brewster the opportunity to
retreat from his vow of “one thousand male leaders a year.” The second committee, led by
historian C. Vann Woodward in 1975, established a nationally renowned code of freedom of
expression at Yale. Woodward’s report allowed Brewster to refurbish his commitments to
student discipline and free speech, commitments often sacrificed to survive the 1960s.
In many ways, the story of pragmatism in the 1960s and moderation in the 1970s —
Brewster’s story — is a lesson in the tactics of effective university governance, an underexamined historical topic. In that first decade, Yale’s president held together the many, oftenwarring factions within the university by deftly choosing stances that pleased the most
quarrelsome groups in times of strife, typically the alumni and the students. And, in the
subsequent quiet years, with the Dahl and Woodward committees, Brewster looked to his faculty
to abrogate his promises to Old Blues and undergraduates.
But this story is more: It is the story of American universities, and the country more
broadly, reaffirming its identity after the turmoil of the 1960s. Seen together, the controversies
over coeducation and student disruption were one debate about the boundaries of the Yale
community: who should be a part of the Yale community and how should that community’s
members act? Far from parochial, what went on in New Haven was news around the nation; and
the Woodward and Dahl committees were part of a larger conversation to determine the
landscape of higher education. They reflected academia and American society reimagining itself,
not in the peak of 1960s social tension, but in the aftermath of the 1970s.
This essay is divided thematically into two parts. The first examines the history of
coeducation until 1972 and the proceedings of Robert Dahl’s committee. The second section
tackles the legacy of student disruption at Yale and Woodward’s reaffirmation of discipline and
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free speech in 1975. We should note that the past was not so neatly divided into concurrent
timelines, but was instead an integrated milieu of events only divisible in retrospect into two
separate narratives. Despite this drawback, a thematic approach simplifies the complex history of
the twenty years spanning the 1960s and 1970s into a manageable format. However, for
Kingman Brewster, his allies, and his enemies, the events did not sort into such distinct
categories.
*******
In the fall of 1968, Yale’s chapter of Students For a Democratic Society (SDS), a national
New Left organization, met with Brewster to lobby for coeducation. In the course of the
conversation, Kingman made a seemingly offhanded remark: Yale would continue to educate
“one thousand male leaders” in every college class. SDS leader Mark Zanger recalled that “I had
even then a suspicion that he was playing us, that he wanted us to disseminate that quote.”10 The
intended audience was Yale’s alumni. Brewster’s colleague and fellow Yale administrator Henry
“Sam” Chauncey, Jr. agreed: the catchphrase was “forty percent” reflective of Brewster’s beliefs,
but “sixty percent” an attempt to assuage traditionalist Yale graduates.11
The motto of “one thousand male leaders” came to embody Brewster’s unwillingness to
coeducate Yale, an unwillingness that extended both before and after that 1968 meeting with
SDS leaders. But what led Kingman to so firmly oppose female undergraduates? And why did
alumni opinion matter? It is to these questions that this essay turns. First, the essay draws upon
existing scholarship to trace the history of coeducation at Yale from the beginning of Brewster’s
presidency in 1963 to the admission of women in 1968 to the formation of Robert Dahl’s
committee, which endorsed sex-blind admissions in 1972. Over those years, Kingman
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

10

Mark Zanger, interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, April 7, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History Project,
Box 12, Folder 155.
11
Chauncey, interview by author, February 14, 2013.
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maintained a standoffish and traditionalist position on coeducation, backing himself into an
increasingly isolated corner to maintain a friendly relationship with Yale alumni opposed to
women at Yale. In this section, the essay examines the role of alumni in the context of university
governance generally and Yale specifically. Second, the essay scrutinizes the inner workings of
the Dahl Committee to argue that Brewster intended the committee to endorse full coeducation,
providing him a shield behind which to moderate his extreme and public stance against an equal
number of men and women at Yale without alienating his alumni base.
In many ways, the campaign to coeducate Yale’ undergraduate body began with
Kingman Brewster’s tenure as president.12 According to the leading historian of admissions in
the Ivy League, Jerome Karabel, the university’s institutional identity was the most masculine of
all campuses across America at the start of the 1960s, with the possible exception of the military
academy at West Point.13 In the words of one woman at the time, Yale was a “totally male
environment. Women just didn’t count. Women were sort of ornaments to the men.”14 Indeed,
when Yale finally admitted women in 1969, the university’s press release announcing the change
characterized the undergraduate college as “a male bastion.”15
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A definitive history of admissions policies at Yale, Harvard, and Princeton in the twentieth century, Jerome
Karabel’s The Chosen remains the best account of coeducation at Yale and a source on which this paper relies
heavily. Jerome Karabel, The Chosen (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005). Geoffrey Kabaservice examines
the campaign for coeducation in the context of university governance in his The Guardians. For another account of
coeducation at Yale, though not as detailed as Karabel’s, see: Joseph Soares, The Power of Privilege: Yale and
America’s Elite Colleges (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). For a very brief chronology of coeducation,
see also: “Coeducation at Yale College: A Brief Chronology” in Different Voices: A Journal of Coeducation at Yale
ed. Rachel Donadio (New Haven: Different Voices, 1995). And, for a comparative analysis of coeducation at Yale
and Princeton, see: Marcia Synnott, “A Friendly Rivalry: Yale and Princeton Pursue Parallel Paths to Coeducation,”
in Going Coed: Women’s Experiences in Formerly Men’s Colleges and Universities, 1950-2000, ed. Leslie MillerBernal and Susan L. Poulson (Nashville: Vanderbilt Press, 2004): 111-150.
13
Karabel, The Chosen, 412.
14
Elga Wasserman, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, May 7, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History
Project, Box 4, Folder 54.
15
Yale University Press Release, April 13, 1969, Office on the Education of Women, Yale University, Records (RU
821). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Box 1, Folder 4.
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In 1962, tasked with crafting a strategic vision for the university, a Yale faculty
committee established some form of coeducation as an abstract goal for the long-term future.
Brewster, then the provost, responded to the report by proclaiming that any future plan for
coeducation would operate on a “coordinate” basis — Yale would either partner with another
female institution, such as the all women’s Vassar College, or build its own parallel school for
women in New Haven. The university would not sacrifice its male identity. This project, he
warned, would be costly: If it wanted to coeducate, Yale would “be in the market for windfall
money,” needing to raise fifty million dollars to build the second sex a home inside the
university’s ivy walls.16 From the outset, the issues of women at Yale and finances were
intrinsically linked, and Brewster ruled out admitting female students because of the perceived
cost.
At the time, Brewster’s position on coeducation conformed to that of the student body
and Yale’s alumni as a whole. Close to three quarters of undergraduates opposed the admission
of women.17 A female presence on campus challenged the university’s masculine ethos. Many
worried that women would eat at Mory’s, the all-male members-only restaurant that served as a
faculty club. Worst of all, how could students concentrate with the ever-present “distraction” of
the feminine form?18
Almost two years later, opinion began to shift. In October of 1963, students protested
outside of Woodbridge Hall, Yale’s main administrative building, urging the inclusion of the
fairer sex.19 Had he been on campus that afternoon, Kingman Brewster would have occupied the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Jethro Liebeman and Alexander Sharp, “Women and Man at Yale,” Yale Daily News, May 9, 1962, 1. On the
report, see also: Brooks Kelley, Yale: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 450-5.
17
Karabel, The Chosen 414. Kelly argues that the report’s suggestion for coeducation shocked the alumni. Kelly,
Yale: A History, 455.
18
Jethro Liebeman and Alexander Sharp, “The Radical Change,” Yale Daily News, May 11, 1962, 1.
19
Karabel, The Chosen, 415.
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building’s corner office — after his predecessor’s death from cancer in April, provost Brewster
had become acting president of the university.
The pressure for coeducation would mount throughout the next six years, culminating in
the admission of women at Yale in 1969. During that process, Brewster’s opposition to women
at Yale, which he continued to attribute to the financial cost of building a coordinate college,
remained constant. The local and national culture, though, increasingly rejected the idea of allmale institutions. As a result, Brewster found himself occupying an originally moderate position
that had grown increasingly conservative.
The drive for coeducation mirrored a larger campaign for inclusion, both in New Haven
and around the country. At Yale, the 1960s saw a conscious effort to diversify the student body
to include blacks, Jews, and public schools students, constituencies previously unwelcome in the
university.20 Nationally, the civil rights movement generated a moral impetus for the acceptance
of African-Americans and other marginalized groups in higher education.21 In many ways,
Yale’s quest to admit women reflected the nation’s changing landscape in the 1960s, as America
struggled to integrate minorities in general and especially into those institutions that provided
pathways to positions of leadership.
In 1966, Kingman formally called for the formation of the coordinate college system with
Vassar. One impetus for this new plan was that the children of Yale alumni were choosing
schools like Harvard, with its sister school Radcliffe, over their fathers’ unisex alma mater.22 At
the same time, Brewster feared displeasing conservative alumni.23 Coeducation with Vassar
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Ibid., 320-409.
Christopher Loss, Between Citizen’s and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 166-197.
22
Soares, The Power of Privilege, 103-5; Kavaservice, The Guardians, 296; Karabel, The Chosen, 416.
23
Kavaservice, The Guardians 297.
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provided the perfect pragmatic solution. It both satisfied students’ desire for female compatriots
and mollified those who wanted Yale to continue educating only men.24
Reflecting Brewster’s compromise position, the Yale Corporation adopted a resolution in
1966 calling for coeducation via the coordinate system. The resolution also insisted that Yale
“not reduce the number of male freshmen.”25 However, Vassar rebuffed Yale’s offer of
coordination a year later, choosing instead to admit men into its all-female student body.26 This
unexpected rejection left Brewster flatfooted. Shortly afterward, in early 1968, Princeton
announced that it would accept women, and vocal support for admitting women continued to
grow among Yale students.
Nevertheless, Brewster maintained his stated position: Yale should establish a separate
women’s college, either through a coordinate system or by building such a college in New
Haven. He estimated the cost of either project at a prohibitive thirty to fifty-five million dollars,
roughly the same figures he had quoted in 1962.27 After his meeting with SDS leaders, Brewster
insisted that Yale educate “a thousand male leaders” in every graduating class, a comment
designed to placate traditionalist alumni. The number of male students would not decrease.
Given that the admission of female students required either a large infusion of cash or the
reduction in Brewster’s one thousand male leaders, Kingman effectively ruled coeducation out.
But, in a “rare display of reformist initiative,” the Yale Corporation disagreed with its own
president’s public declarations.28 Its members instructed him to admit five hundred women in the
fall of 1969.29
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Soares, The Power of Privilege, 107.
Synnott, “A Friendly Rivalry,” 113; Karabel, The Chosen, 417.
26
Ibid; Karabel, The Chosen, 418.
27
Ibid.
28
Soares, The Power of Privilege, 107.
29
Synnott, “A Friendly Rivalry,” 117. It is possible that the Yale Corporation was actually more reluctant than
Brewster to endorse coeducation, and that Brewster wanted the Corporation to overturn his public stance for
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Why did Kingman Brewster want to please those alumni who opposed coeducation?
What tangible benefit did they provide Yale’s president? In order to answer these two questions,
we need to examine the nature of university governance more broadly, both at Yale and other
American institutions of higher learning.30
Reflecting on academia during the 1960s, Clark Kerr once compared the modern
university to monarchical France, where the king balanced the interests of a variety of different
“estates.” So too, for Kerr, the university president managed a comparable series of academic
estates, juggling the wishes of faculty, students, and alumni, as well as state governments and
corporations.31 To govern effectively, the ideal president cajoled, conceded and mediated a series
of compromises that pleased each of these constituencies.32 And each estate possessed different
types of power within the university: The faculty affected decisions within their departments.
Students could protest or disrupt university functions. Governments could expand or contract the
budgets of public institutions to exert pressure. For Kerr, a school’s alumni represented a “minor
estate” whose ability to influence its alma mater was often weak in many universities.33
A close friend of Kingman Brewster, Clark Kerr was well positioned to discuss higher
education governance in the 1960s, having served first as chancellor of UC-Berkley and then
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
political reasons. According to one observer, in the meeting in which the Corporation affirmed its plans to admit
women, Brewster authored the initial resolution. Prominent corporation members then revised Brewster’s draft to
remove sections implying the university would eventually educate an equal number of men and women. See: John
Embersits, interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, June 15, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History Project, Box
4, Folder 54.
30
Scholarship on the history of university governance is deceptively broad but actually shallow. For the most part,
the field remains the purview of social scientists, who tend to examine the topic from a highly technical vantage
point. There are some exceptions to this rule. First published in 1960, Frederick Rudolph’s The American College
and University examines the origins of modern university governance in America in his larger survey of higher
education history. It remains one of the best texts in the field. Frederick Rudolph, The American College and
University (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1960). For a more modern take on the same topic, see: Arthur
Cohen, The Shaping of American Higher Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998).
31
Clark Kerr, The Great Transformation in Higher Education, 1960-1980 (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1991), 200.
32
Ibid., 201.
33
Ibid.
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later as the president of the University of California system, just as those institutions began
experiencing intense student unrest. 34 Heralded by Time as the “master planner” of American
education, Kerr occupied a national stage, much like Brewster did from his prominent perch in
New Haven. 35
At Yale, the alumni estate possessed considerably more sway than the graduates of the
typical university that Kerr depicted. But the Yale alumni’s power was not the power of the
purse, a mistaken conclusion drawn by some commentators.36 Brewster did not oppose
coeducation because he feared conservative donors would flee the university. The majority of
Yale’s donations stemmed from the generosity of a few wealthy alumni, such as philanthropists
Paul Mellon and John Hay Whitney, both of whom graduated from Yale College in the 1920s.
Liberal on social issues such as coeducation, these men’s contributions far outweighed those of
the average alumni.37 What is more, internal studies at Yale during the early 1970s found that
those alumni who threatened to withhold money from the university had not been active donors
in the past.38 Yale never stood to lose serious money if it adopted coeducation.
Instead, the alumni possessed a kind of “parliamentary” power, according to Brewster’s
aide and confidant Sam Chauncey. Like Clark Kerr, Kingman often remarked that he reigned
over three “constituencies” — the faculty, the students, and the university’s graduates — and he
could not “lose a majority of all of them.”39 While the Yale Corporation technically appointed
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34

Chauncey, interview by author, February 14, 2013.
“Master Planner,” Time, October 17, 1960.
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For an example of a modern commentator who saw alumni donations as a source of alumni authority, see Soares,
The Power of Privilege, 107.
37
On Whitney’s relationship to Yale, see: E. J. Kahn, Jr., Jock: The Life and Times of John Hay Whitney (New
York: Doubleday, 1981), 297-319; on Paul Mellon, see: Paul Mellon, Reflections in a Silver Spoon (New York:
Morrow, 1992).
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and removed presidents from office, a public loss of confidence in any of these estates would
have tipped the Corporation’s hand and forced it to dethrone Kingman.
Coeducation was by no means the only issue that rankled conservative Yalies in the
1960s. The admission of minorities and fewer alumni children left many Old Blues feeling
sour.40 Nor were the alumni the only estate in danger of revolting. As this essay discusses in
greater detail in the second section, Brewster simultaneously faced student protest. In this
environment of heightened discord, maintaining a stance against women at Yale mollified some
alumni by preserving the masculine nature of Yale College. In part, Brewster’s personal views
played into his pragmatic decision: Unlike African Americans or Jews, minorities he realized
faced discrimination and who could contribute to society if given the opportunity, Brewster
possessed traditional opinions about the opposite sex.41 Nevertheless, as Chauncey suggested,
Brewster’s commitment to an all-male Yale largely stemmed from his desire to please
traditionalists, an important segment of the alumni estate.
“Yale Officially Begins Era of Coeducation” blared the Yale Daily News, on September
3, 1969, as the first “coeds” stepped foot on campus.42 While women found seats in the
classroom, their male counterparts still outnumbered them by overwhelming margins. Pressure
quickly mounted to equalize the gender balance; Brewster instead doubled down on his pledge to
educate one thousand men a year, a promise that excluded gender equality on campus. The
tension came to a head in the spring of 1970, when hundreds of alumni gathered for a luncheon
in New Haven. In a protest covered by national news outlets, forty students stormed the room,
took the microphone, and demanded that the university admit more women, explicitly decrying
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Kingman’s catchphrase.43 After the disruption, the president reclaimed the podium and offered a
frank rejoinder that found its way into the next day’s press. In his words: The alumni deserved
“accountability.” “One thousand male leaders” would remain the norm, for the sake of alumni
“nostalgia.” Only by building two new residential buildings and expanding the entire student
body could Yale possibly accommodate more women — an unlikely scenario given fiscal
constraints. The assembled alumni applauded Brewster enthusiastically.44 According to
Chauncey, Kingman thought the Old Blues would “skewer him if he [had] retreated from the
principle of training a thousand men.”45
Thus, to preserve a “parliamentary” majority of the alumni, Brewster maintained his
commitment to a male-dominated college. But by 1971, he found himself at the extreme fringe
of the ideological spectrum, committed to protecting “nostalgia.” He faced a quandary: Should
the university maintain the status quo? Or should the student body increase in size, to
accommodate more women? Or, more drastic yet, should Yale abandon the pledge to the alumni
and decrease the number of men? Brewster opted for the third choice. Ever skillful at balancing
the various estates over which he governed, he formed a carefully designed faculty committee
whose mission was to re-imagine every aspect of Yale College. That group, Brewster knew,
would endorse sex-blind admissions as part of its proceedings, providing him a graceful
opportunity in which to relinquish his vision of “one thousand male leaders.” It is to that
committee and its inner workings that we now turn.
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*******
In October of 1971, the Study Group on Yale College met for the first time. Three of the
five people in the room were among Yale’s most accomplished professors. In the chairman’s seat
sat Robert Dahl, an eminent political scientist whose groundbreaking study of New Haven
politics, Who Governs?, was the urtext on urban democracy.46 One member, William Kessen,
had pioneered the field of child developmental psychology.47 Another, physicist and incoming
dean of Yale College Horace Taft, had been lauded that August by the New York Times as a rare
“humanistic scientist,” who enjoyed playing Bach when not in the laboratory.48 Not as nationally
renowned but certainly a public face at Yale, Brewster’s special assistant on matters of
coeducation Elga Wasserman occupied the fourth place at the table. The final member of the
Study Group, the much younger Jonathan Spence, remembered being “startled” to find himself
alongside “the most respected and admired faculty” in the university.49
Appointed by Brewster, the five-person committee enjoyed an extremely broad mandate:
Examine what “the task of undergraduate education at Yale ought to be for the next couple of
decades.”50 No stone was to be unturned. Dahl and his colleagues were to concern themselves
with finances, coeducation, the residential colleges, and every other aspect of undergraduate
life.51 For the next year, the group — colloquially known as the Dahl Committee —
systematically researched for “unbelievable hours.”52 The members surveyed faculty, students,
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and alumni to gather a wide swath of opinions; they examined the recommendations of past and
current Yale committees; and they studied peer institutions in the hope of learning from other
schools’ best practices.
Finally, in 1972, this working group published a one hundred and seventeen page report
calling for sweeping changes to Yale. Among Dahl’s recommendations: A longer academic
calendar, a three-year baccalaureate degree program, and a plan for faculty mentorship of
students. The committee also endorsed complete coeducation, writing that undergraduate
admissions should be “granted on the basis of qualifications without regard to sex.”53 After
heated debate, the faculty rejected the more innovative academic suggestions. In contrast, the
Yale Corporation adopted sex-neutral admissions.
Brewster tasked Dahl with the monumental mission of compiling a holistic vision for
Yale College; determining the status of women on campus was a substantial, though by no
means defining, aspect of that project. Two larger factors, student disaffection with the academic
environment in the 1960s and the declining economy of the early 1970s, had led to the
committee’s sweeping assignment. Brewster meant the Dahl Committee to reinvent Yale for the
modern age — to forge a new, financially secure institution that appealed to the most talented
undergraduates. Because coeducation intersected both the fiscal and academic aspects of the
university, the Study Group addressed that particular issue in this moment of institutional
redefinition.
Nationally, the early 1960s saw students rebel against the traditional liberal arts
education. At colleges across the country, undergraduates demanded a more relevant curriculum,
calling for both novel ways of teaching that eschewed the impersonal lecture hall and new
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content that spoke to the immediate problems of American society.54 Toward the end of the
decade, universities established African American studies program and began forming women’s
studies departments, reflecting the desires of a more diverse student body that protested
vigorously for change.55
Partially in response to the demand for different curricula, institutions of higher learning
entered a period of self-reflection, best epitomized by the Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education. Led by Clark Kerr and funded by the Carnegie Foundation from 1967 until 1973, the
Commission was seen as “the most extensive examination of America’s universities and colleges
to date,” publishing over fifty books on topics ranging from university governance to
curriculum.56 The Study Group on Yale College mirrored this national trend in academic soul
searching. When he formed the committee, Brewster publicly told the Dahl Committee its task
was to re-think “the objectives and functions of college education,” leading to “a comprehensive
reappraisal.”57 Thus, in 1971, Yale and other schools found themselves in a moment of what
appeared to be immense academic transition.
In addition, an increasingly depressed American economy threatened many universities’
financial stability, as reductions in federal funding and falling endowment returns stripped
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budgets.58 At Yale, Brewster projected a four to five million dollar operating deficit for the 19712 academic year.59 The university cut library hours and other essential services to try to fill the
gap, but, despite these efforts, structural reform seemed necessary to stem the difference between
revenue and expenses.60 Consequently, Brewster ordered the Study Group to “especially”
concentrate on the “financial feasibility” of its vision for Yale College.61
The issue of coeducation touched on both the academic and financial purviews of Robert
Dahl’s mandate. Whom Yale admitted reflected who most deserved education — a contested
question central to the “objective” of Yale College that Dahl was supposed to define. Moreover,
since the inception of the coordinate plan for coeducation in 1962, Brewster had consistently
quoted the cost of increasing the student body at approximately fifty million dollars. Admitting
additional women, without reducing the number of men, would have required cash the university
did not have. Even a promised “windfall” gift from the wealthy Corporation member and alum
John Hay Whitney to build two new residential colleges would not have solved Brewster’s fiscal
dilemma. If the university expanded its physical plant to accommodate more women, fixed costs
for related expenses would have also increased.62
The Dahl Committee resolved this dilemma by calling for sex-blind admissions and an
equal number of men and women on campus. Most scholars depict this recommendation as a
blow to Kingman Brewster and his pledge to educate one thousand male leaders. That standard
narrative, though, is incorrect.63 A savvy university politician, Brewster likely wanted the
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committee to overturn his previous opposition to women at Yale. He included his assistant on
matters of coeducation, Elga Wasserman, on the Dahl Committee knowing that she would push
the Study Group to endorse complete coeducation. Moreover, Wasserman’s records and the
committee’s minutes suggest that she and her colleagues intentionally authored their report with
Brewster’s political machinations in mind. And, after its publication, Brewster touted Dahl’s
report in such a way as to convince Yale’s alumni of the importance of coeducation. The Study
Group championed the positions he could not advance without contradicting himself and thus
provided Yale’s president the cover he wanted and needed to retreat from his earlier positions
regarding coeducation.
The composition of the Study Group was no accident. Brewster picked loyal senior faculty
whom he trusted and who would engender the trust of students and alumni. Robert Dahl and
William Kessen topped the list of people whose counsel Yale’s president consistently sought.64
Brewster particularly relied upon Dahl to handle delicate situations, previously tapping the
author of Who Governs? to write a landmark report on tenure in 1966 and to pioneer the African
American Studies department. Dahl initially abhorred these assignments, having once threatened
to leave Yale unless Brewster wrote him a letter freeing him of these “administrative

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
expansion would permit him to keep the same number of men were dashed by the Dahl Committee.” Karabel further
implies that Yale’s president received the opposite of what he wanted from the report — a mandate to admit women
without the means to keep his promises to the alumni. However, only if one takes Brewster’s statements at face
value is this a plausible analysis. See: Karabel, The Chosen, 425. Other commentators portray a similar picture,
though not as explicitly as Karabel. For instance, in a Yale student journal commemorating the twenty-fifth
anniversary of coeducation, a timeline juxtaposes the Dahl Committee’s report with Kingman’s vocal support of a
quota system. The contrast carries an implicit message: The Study Group wanted full coeducation, but Brewster
disagreed with the report’s aims and really wanted “a thousand male leaders” at Yale. “Coeducation at Yale College:
A Brief Chronology” in Different Voices. In a thoroughly researched article, Marcia Synnott echoes the student
journal’s timeline. She too notes Brewster’s comments in apparent opposition to the Dahl Report’s conclusions.
Synnott, “A Friendly Rivalry,” 123.
64
“There were faculty members whose advice he would seek: people like Bob Dahl, Bill Kessen, a couple of people
in the Law School, John Blum.” John A Wilkinson, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, May 19, 1992, GriswoldBrewster History Project, Box 12 Folder 151.

Zelinsky 20!
responsibilities.” That assurance became something of a joke between the two men, as president
Brewster repeatedly approached Dahl with various requests.65
Moreover, Dahl “was seen as one of the great mediators” of the university; he was fair,
honest, and open-minded.66 In April of 1969, four thousand Yale students and faculty gathered in
Ingalls Hockey rink to debate the status of ROTC on campus. The meeting threatened to turn
raucous when the students shouted down provost Charles Taylor, the moderator, who planned to
accept only pre-selected speeches. Dahl was chosen by consensus to replace Taylor, a result that
placated the unruly faculty and students. The meeting proceeded without a hitch, with orderly
speeches from the floor.67 Dahl’s reputation would lend the Study Group’s recommendations —
including and exceeding complete coeducation — substantial credibility.
But did Brewster intend the Dahl Committee to endorse sex-blind admissions? It
certainly seems so. By appointing Elga Wasserman to the committee, he knew that she would
support an increased female population at Yale. In 1968, Brewster hired Wasserman, then an
administrator and scientist in the Graduate School, to manage Yale College’s transition to a
coeducated environment. The two developed a close relationship, as they together tackled the
many dilemmas of integrating coeds into an all-male environment.68
While Wasserman faithfully executed Brewster’s directives as his assistant, she also
played the part of the loyal opposition, consistently advocating for more female undergraduates.
In the first year of coeducation, women often complained to her that they “just didn’t like the
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[gender] ratio.” In particular, it was difficult to find “suitable roommates” with so few female
peers on campus.69 Elga took up their cause. Her initial report on the progress of coeducation
advocated doubling the number of women at Yale.70 She also abhorred Brewster’s commitment
to one thousand male leaders. Dining at a Radcliffe alumnae luncheon in New York when the
president first coined his catchphrase, Wasserman remembered that the comment “didn’t sit very
well” with her.71 As she pressured the president to fully embrace coeducation, she forced
Kingman to remind her in writing of his “unambiguous statement” to “not reduce the admissions
of men to Yale College.”72 Nevertheless, in her position as the chief women’s advocate at Yale,
Wasserman remained devoted to complete equality of the sexes on campus.
When he appointed the Dahl Committee in 1971, Brewster publicly told the Study Group
that “no one of you is ‘representative’ of your rank, or field, or other ‘constituency.’ Indeed, you
collectively have no constituency.”73 In part, his comment preempted the inevitable criticism that
the body lacked even the semblance of diversity. Four of the committee members were white
men, three of whom were senior faculty; the most junior, Jonathan Spence, was English by birth,
speaking with a lilted accent more patrician than plebian. At a time when African Americans
asked for increased representation in university governance, the lack of a minority member on
the panel was a sure source of contention. Had he only included Dahl and the other men on the
panel, the president’s statement may have smoothed some of that friction.
However, Brewster’s assurance that no member of the panel was a “representative” of a
“constituency” clashed with Wasserman’s place on the Study Group — her prime qualification
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was being the female assistant to the president for coeducation. In retrospect, Chauncey noted
that Brewster “had to put Elga on, both because of her background and because [he had no other
viable women].”74 Brewster’s claim that Wasserman was anything but Yale’s female advocate
was pure ipse dixit.
Yale’s black community quickly highlighted Brewster’s inattention to minorities on the
Dahl Committee. Director of African American Studies Roy S. Bryce-Laporte wrote to the
president that he was shocked by the “invisibility of Blacks …whether as members of the
Committee or as a crucial component for consideration.” For Bryce-Laporte, this perceived slight
was especially galling, given that Brewster had directed the Study Group to focus on the plight
of female students and had appointed his “Director of Coeducation” to Dahl’s committee.75
Brewster uncharacteristically exposed himself to criticism in the arena of racial politics by
explicitly focusing on the needs of women over other minorities. That he did so spoke to
importance of the Study Group as a vehicle for resolving the issue of Yale’s gender ratio.
After having been assigned to Dahl’s team, Wasserman all but informed Brewster that
she would use the committee to achieve an increased female presence on campus. In an August
1971 progress report on coeducation sent to the president, she noted that, if the Study Group
“makes specific recommendations concerning the long range course of coeducation at Yale, it
could have a major effect on the future course of the education of women at Yale and
elsewhere.”76 The report also expressed hope that the Dahl Committee could achieve “a better
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balance of men and women in Yale College.”77 Wasserman’s vision for the Dahl Committee was
no secret.
In fact, there is evidence that Wasserman and other faculty who desired complete
coeducation pressured Brewster to make her part of the Study Group. The University Committee
on Coeducation, a group that Wasserman chaired, met in February of 1972, only two months
before the Dahl Committee released its final report that April. With Wasserman absent, the
committee debated writing a letter urging Brewster to adopt sex-blind admissions. According to
the minutes, one member noted that, “our Committee played a major part in the appointment of
the Dahl Committee.” Why not wait for Elga and that body to make the decision for Kingman?78
And she did just that, authoring the Dahl Report’s section on coeducation that January.79
Did Brewster and Wasserman privately conspire for the latter to endorse gender-neutral
admissions at the former’s behest? Did Kingman discuss the matter with Dahl, his loyal faculty
agent? We cannot know for sure. Jonathan Spence remembered receiving no firm directives,
implied or explicit, from the president — as junior faculty, though, he may not have been privy
to Brewster’s political maneuvering.80 What is safe to infer: In appointing Wasserman to the
Study Group, Brewster knew the committee would recommend an increase in female students,
undermining the president’s pledge to a male-dominated university.
On the optimal size of Yale College, a matter closely related to coeducation, the Dahl
Committee did consider the president’s wishes. The story plays out in the Study Group’s
minutes. On October 14, 1971, Dahl retold to the committee a conversation between himself and
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George Langdon, a deputy provost. According to Langdon, the provost and treasurer desired a
larger student body to raise revenue. Brewster, though, disagreed, and wanted to preserve the
existing size of Yale College. The president, Langdon implied, “might be better able to resist
pressure for an increase if the Study Group comes down hard against an increase.”81 The
following day, the committee met again, and Dahl mused that the group should adopt a firm
stance against an “increase [in] size.” 82 While other factors likely also influenced Dahl’s
ultimate decision, this evidence suggests that the committee understood that it served Brewster’s
interests.
Regardless of whether its members were conscious coconspirators, Kingman used the
Study Group as a shield behind which he could endorse full coeducation. In February, the
president announced that any adjustment in the ratio of women would await the recommendation
of the Dahl Committee. In his words, to unilaterally reduce the number of men would violate his
“commitment” to the alumni. If, on the other hand, he admitted more female undergraduates as
part of an “overall reassessment of the future of Yale College,” Brewster would preserve the
alumni’s “confidence.”83 The president thus strived to incorporate coeducation into a larger
narrative of academic change. A moment of institutional self-reflection became a modern-day
Sabbatical year in which Kingman could break his past promises of “one thousand male leaders.”
In April, Dahl’s committee published The Report of The Study Group on Yale College,
and Yale aggressively marketed its various recommendations, including full coeducation. The
university printed ten thousand copies; every alumnus who donated more than five thousand
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dollars received one in the mail.84 For the less generous, the Yale Alumni Magazine printed an
abridged version of the report in a special issue that devoted substantial attention to the proposal
for sex-blind admissions.85 University officials personally lobbied reporters from leading outlets,
such as Time and Newsweek, to write about the Dahl Committee.86 And their efforts met with
success. A few newspapers, including the New York Times, reported on the Study Group’s report,
analyzing the proposal for a three-year undergraduate degree and summer classes side-by-side
the call for more women on campus.87 Through this varied public relations campaign, Brewster
successfully situated coeducation within the broader context of the holistic reexamination of both
Yale College and the purposes of higher education.
Ironically, that holistic vision for Yale failed to materialize in almost every aspect—
except for the admission of more women. At a meeting that May, the vast majority of professors
rejected the Study Group’s proposals, condemning year-round teaching as burdensome.88 Dahl’s
report quickly became something of a joke in the Yale community. When a group of senior
faculty met to play charades a few months later, one person mimed the Dahl Committee by
yawning.89 By contrast, coeducation’s advocates touted Dahl. In October of 1972, six months
after the Study Group had disbanded, the Committee on Coeducation publicly exhorted Brewster

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84

Deane C. Laycock, memo to Kingman Brewster, March 17, 1972, Office of the President, Yale University,
Annual and Special Reports, Box 30, Folder 1.
85
Deane C. Laycock, memo to Jonathan Fanton, March 10, 1972, Ibid. The special issue devoted over twenty
percent of its nineteen pages to Dahl’s recommendations on female admissions, despite those recommendations only
consisting of a fraction of the published report’s total length. Proof of the Abridged Dahl Report in the Yale Alumni
Magazine, April 7, 1972, Ibid.
86
Steve Kezerian, Letter to Jonathan Fanton, April 7, 1972, Ibid.
87
M. A. Farber, “Yale Faculty Unit Asks Wide Reforms,” New York Times, Apr 9, 1972, 67; “Yale Study Urges
Degree In 3 Years, More Women,” Hartford Courant, Apr 8, 1972, 10; William Henry, “Yale panel asks 3-year BA,
abolition of majors, no sex quota,” Boston Globe, Apr 9, 1972, 54.
88
John Curley, “Faculty Meeting Discusses Dahl Committee Proposals,” Yale Daily News, May 5, 1972, 1.
89
Jonathan Fanton, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, July 18, 1992, Griswold-Brewster History Project, Box 12,
Folder 155.

Zelinsky 26!
to adopt the report’s policies on admissions.90 In November, the president delayed any final
decision on the number of female undergraduates until the Alumni Association could survey its
members. Then, in December, the Yale Corporation formally eliminated quotas for women while
simultaneously maintaining the size of the student body — though they also paradoxically
established an “optimal” composition of Yale College as sixty percent male.91 At that moment,
Kingman’s commitment to one thousand leaders was officially a promise of the past.
*******
In Who Governs, Robert Dahl examined New Haven as a case study of how various factions
exerted influence in urban politics. Given Dahl’s prominent place in this story, it is fitting to ask,
“Who governed Yale?” Starting in 1962, the alumni estate (to use Clark Kerr’s term) dictated the
pace of coeducation. To please them, Brewster dragged his feet on admitting women, first
advocating the Vassar merger, then touting the formation of a coordinate college, and finally
vowing to preserve one thousand male leaders.
By 1971, this position had become untenable. So Kingman employed the powers of another
estate, the faculty, to check alumni influence. Realizing he could not retreat from his stance
unilaterally, he reframed the issue of coeducation as part of a larger, institutional reformation. If
Yale College were to substantially transform its character, his promises to the old-guard would
no longer apply. In Dahl and his colleagues, Brewster collected a loyal cadre. Without explicitly
telling them to (as far as we can tell), the president knew they would endorse sex-blind
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admissions, particularly so given Wasserman’s place on the Study Group. Brewster used them to
moderate his extreme position.
Would the Corporation have abolished quotas without Dahl’s Report? Would Brewster have
been able to revise his commitment to one male thousand leaders by himself? While we can
never definitively answer these counterfactuals, we can say how Brewster governed Yale:
through forming coalitions, first with his alumni and then with his faculty. On the issue of
coeducation, he tacked to an increasingly conservative position and then gracefully triangulated
himself a new course.
America followed Brewster’s story. From the Vassar plan, to the protest at the 1970 alumni
luncheon, to the final decision to reject gender quotas, the struggle for women to become Elis
received national attention. In the public limelight, Yale shed its older skin and redefined who
deserved to be a part of the university community. We turn now to the intertwined issues of
student disruption, discipline, and free speech where Kingman similarly and publicly bent to the
pressures of the 1960s and then forged a more moderate path in the early 1970s. If the Study
Group determined the composition of Yale’s student body, then the Committee on Freedom of
Expression chaired by C. Vann Woodward outlined how those new students should act. Just as
Dahl’s committee represented a moment of institutional reexamination, Woodward’s represented
a high-water-mark in Kingman’s efforts to reshape the Yale community.
*******
“Disruption is not a valid part of the University…You are all subject to academic
suspension.” Yale’s Secretary, Kingman Brewster’s right hand man, and the second most
powerful person on campus in 1974, Henry “Sam” Chauncey Jr. faced a crowd of jeering
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students in the largest lecture hall at Yale. The noise of the protestors was deafening. They
clapped, stomped, and chanted — and generally ignored Chauncey’s proclamation.
On the lecture hall’s stage sat William Shockley, the distinguished inventor of the transistor
who, late in his life, had become an advocate for the sterilization of minorities he judged racially
inferior. Alongside him was William Rusher, editor of the conservative magazine National
Review. The two had intended to debate the morality of Shockley’s views in front of a student
audience. The assembled crowd of two hundred and fifty had a different idea: Drown Shockley
out, in violation of university rules, denying him an opportunity to voice his offensive ideas. 92
On the street outside, an even larger group protested behind roped picket lines, chanting
“Shockley, Nazi. Shockley, Nazi.” 93 A few threw rocks, but, for the most part, they eschewed
violence in favor of a civil demonstration. Inside, a different story prevailed. For seventy-five
minutes, as Chauncey bit his lip and frowned, the raucous student disruptors prevented Shockley
from speaking.94 After an hour and fifteen minutes, Shockley and Rusher departed without
debating, and the protestors disbanded victorious.
The Shockley incident, as it became known, was no anomaly in 1974, either at Yale or for
the nation. Starting in the early 1960s, college-age protestors affiliated with the New Left had
adopted increasingly confrontational tactics, many of which found their origin in the sit-ins of
the civil rights movement. On campuses across the nation, students married these methods with a
philosophy of direct action, occupying classrooms or heckling speakers to highlight issues
ranging from the Vietnam War to the rights of workers. As a result, the normally distinct issues
of freedom of expression at universities and student discipline became intertwined over the
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decade. Students disrupted lectures that they deemed offensive or immoral, and academic
administrators punished (or failed to punish) demonstrators for violating academia’s core
principles. Yale proved a typical and highly visible setting for unrest, experiencing a wave of
disruptions beginning in 1963. To prevent the university from erupting into flames, Kingman
Brewster typically acceded to student demands, pragmatically sacrificing principles of discipline
and free speech to satisfy protestors.
After Shockley, Brewster found himself increasingly criticized by moderates among his
faculty and alumni who decried his failures to preserve order on campus. Just as he had with
coeducation, Brewster found himself occupying an extreme position, this time lenient toward
unrest. To repair his broken image and maintain a coalition of support within two disaffected
academic estates of the university, Brewster again looked to a faculty committee. Led by C.
Vann Woodward, that group authored a nationally renowned document that condemned
disruption, upheld the values of free speech and tolerance, and provided Brewster an opportunity
to remold his and Yale’s reputation.95
This section of the essay is divided into two parts. The first traces the history of unrest at
Yale in the national context and documents the growing dissatisfaction among some with
Brewster’s management of Yale’s campus. The second section examines the results of the
Woodward Committee and argues that, just as he had with the Study Group on Yale College,
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Brewster designed this body to achieve a specific political result intended to rehabilitate his
image.
Like coeducation, the issue of unrest and free speech first arose while Brewster was the
acting president of Yale in 1963. On September 19, the Yale Daily News reported that the
Political Union, a student group, had invited Alabama Governor George Wallace to speak on
campus that November.96 Four days earlier, a bomb had exploded in a black church in
Birmingham, Alabama, killing four African-American children. Civil rights leaders, including
Marin Luther King, Jr. and the head of the NAACP, Roy Wilkins, blamed Wallace for inspiring
the bombing by voicing vocal segregationist opinions in the preceding years.97 Convinced that
hosting the governor at Yale might inflame tensions among New Haven’s sizable black
population, Brewster met privately with students in the days before September 19 to urge them to
rescind the invitation.98 Immediately after the Yale Daily publicized the invitation, Mayor
Richard Lee publicly announced that Wallace was “officially unwelcome” in the Elm City.99 The
same day, the Political Union publicly announced that it had retracted its offer, and Brewster
issued a press release that stated he was “grateful” for “this decision in the interest of law and
order.”100
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To most observers around the country, it seemed that Brewster had caved to both Lee’s
pressure and to the threat of violence from members of the New Haven black community.101 For
the president, pragmatic concerns of preventing bloodshed outweighed the principle of free
expression. In an editorial, the New York Times decried the loss of free inquiry at Yale.102
Seeking to rehabilitate the university’s image as a bastion of free expression, a group of law
students re-invited Wallace, who declined this second opportunity; Brewster offered his firm
support for the Governor’s right to speak on campus, backpedaling from his previous statements.
But, despite these efforts at repair, Kingman’s reputation suffered. Some trustees questioned his
fitness as president given his failure to artfully navigate the incident.103 Their reluctance was no
doubt compounded by the memory of Brewster’s predecessor, A. Whitney Griswold, who had
been a national advocate for academic freedom during the McCarthyism of the 1950s. According
to Sam Chauncey, the scandal deeply affected Brewster. In later years, when making a “major
institutional decision,” Kingman would often tell his assistant, “I’ve got to make sure I don’t
make the kind of mistake I made in the Wallace case.”104
In the Wallace affair, the threat of disruption originated outside the university in New
Haven’s inner city. With the emergence of the Free Speech Movement, a year later, similar
unrest found its way onto college campuses. The Movement began at Berkeley, when students
led by Mario Savio occupied an administrative building to challenge rules prohibiting political
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activism on university property. Active civil rights demonstrators, Savio and his compatriots had
participated in sit-ins, both in California and the South. They applied those confrontational
tactics to the university setting, refusing to leave the building until they achieved their
demands.105 University officials found themselves with few options: Either give-in to the
occupiers wishes or spark an altercation by confronting the students. At Yale and schools around
America, administrators watched the proceedings in Berkeley with rapt interest, little knowing
that similar protests would shortly materialize in their own quads.106
After President Johnson announced an aggressive military commitment in Vietnam in 1965,
student unrest became increasingly violent.107 Ivy League campuses were often the sites of
public disruptions. At Columbia, with somewhat mixed motivations, students protested the war
and a proposed university construction project by occupying a series of buildings — only to be
evicted forcibly by the New York Police Department. Cornell saw a particularly violent takeover
of its classrooms by armed African-American undergraduates who called for the formation of an
African American Studies department. That university agreed to their demands, in what became
a national symbol of appeasement to student violence and a breakdown in the system of
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academic discipline.108 Incidents of unrest peaked during the 1969-70 academic year, when
campuses across the country experienced 9,400 separate disruptions.109!!
Brewster’s Yale actually defied the trend of unrest until November of 1969, when the
university saw a major student occupation. A classics professor at Cornell during its period of
upheaval, Donald Kagan remembered that Yale seemed like “the one place in the country where
things seemed to be in good control.” When he accepted a faculty position in New Haven, his
colleagues in Ithaca told him how lucky he was to be moving to a stable university.110 They
admired Kingman’s firm and vocal stance against disruption, embodied in a document Brewster
had published in the spring of 1969.111* What became known as the “Brewster scenario” started
as an “intellectual exercise” in how Yale would face an event similar to those at Columbia or
Cornell.112 The scenario mapped out a policy of “flexibility and firmness” in the face of
disruption: The president would propose meeting with protesting students in another forum to
address their requests. If students rejected the offer, they would be “subject to immediate
suspension.” And if, even after suspension, students continued to interfere with university
personal and property, administrators would call the campus police.113 On paper, the Brewster
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scenario advertised a “hard-line” yet pragmatic approach that combined a commitment to
discipline and civility with a tone of respect for student radicals.114
Unfortunately, Brewster’s scenario for a disruption disintegrated in its first test case in
1969. When the university fired a black dining worker for rudeness, sixty students affiliated with
SDS protested her abrupt dismissal by occupying her bosses’ offices in the dingy basement of
Wright Hall. They refused to leave until the fired worker regained her job. With Brewster out of
town on a Caribbean vacation, the job of defusing the situation fell to Sam Chauncey and
Provost Charles Taylor. The two men were flummoxed — they had expected protests at major
university buildings, not an obscure location like Wright Hall. In retrospect, Chauncey
remembered, “we were kind of winging it.”115 Per the Brewster scenario, they suspended fortyseven students who refused to leave. (The students only later left after officials agreed to rehire
the dismissed employee.)116
A faculty-student coalition formed immediately to reinstate the suspended occupiers. One
professor lauded sit-ins as a “defensible tactic.”117 In an unexpected twist, the university
executive committee responsible for student discipline commuted the sentences, citing a desire to
show “mercy.”118 Brewster’s famed scenario failed completely. William Kessen noted that his
colleagues were “dramatically divided,” a sentiment which others echoed.119 The president
himself was livid that his normally loyal faculty had betrayed him.120 But in an odd way, the
disloyal professors seemed very Brewster-esque in retrospect. They pragmatically abandoned
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disciplinary principles — enshrined in the Brewster’s scenario — to mollify their angry peers
and students.
Five months later, May Day rocked New Haven, and, as a nation watched, Brewster
reassumed the mantle of the high priest of pragmatism. In the days before the Bobby Seale trial
and mass protests, he eschewed any rigid ideals he might have held, telling Sam Chauncey that
their objectives were simple: no deaths, no burnings, and no academic disruption — in that order.
In Chauncey’s words, Kingman ““[p]ragmatically developed [his principles] to fit what we
thought the circumstances would be.”121 Yale officials opened doors to the Black Panthers,
Yippies, and assorted other demonstrators, even feeding them in the hope that, satiated, the mob
would not attack the university.122 When Brewster publicly doubted the ability of a black man to
receive justice in America, commentators saw a former law professor sacrifice his faith in the
legal system to placate radicals on the streets.123 And he succeeded: no one died at Yale. Four
days later, National Guardsmen shot and killed students at Kent State. There, but for pragmatism
and the grace of God, went Kingman.
In the aftermath of May Day, Brewster found himself in a political maelstrom. He had
effectively closed the university, worse bent his commitment to the American legal system, in
the face of the threat of violence. The pushback was strong. That summer, a collection of
conservative alumni formed Lux et Veritas, Incorporated, citing the president’s speech about the
Seale trial as a chief grievance and calling for broad reform at Yale.124 In a mailing to their
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fellow Yale graduates, the group worried their alma mater was turning into an institution that
smothered “opposing viewpoints.”125
While LEVI, as the organization became known, never attracted much support, it
implied a more widespread discontent among Yale graduates. Letters criticizing Kingman poured
into the president’s office, some so harsh that an aide remarked they “should have been written
on asbestos.” 126 Capping off an academic year that also saw the beginning of coeducation, May
Day became a “lighting rod” for all the alumni “anxieties” at Yale.127!!Sensing that he could lose
the alumni estate altogether, Brewster created a special committee to investigate bettering
relations with Old Blues.128 Worse than the alumni revolt, many in the faculty reacted negatively
as well to Brewster’s comments about the American judiciary, though they praised his overall
handling of May Day.129 In the summer of 1970, Kingman was ironically branded a radical, just
as he was about to begin the process of restoring his image via the Dahl Committee.
Nationally, student protests and occupations peaked and petered out after 1970, but the
unlucky Brewster faced more moments of unrest that morphed into embarrassing incidents. The
same day the Study Group released its report in April of 1972, General William Westmoreland,
the former commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, visited campus to deliver a speech at the
Political Union. A large and pugnacious student crowd gathered to protest his talk;
Westmoreland refused to speak publicly out of fear for his safety.130 Brewster tried and failed to
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appear moderate, paradoxically criticizing both the General for balking in front of an unruly
crowd and the students for their “reprehensible” tactics.131 Once again, Yale seemed lawless and
Brewster weak in the eyes of the nation, his alumni, and his professorial peers.
The figurative straw that broke Brewster’s back came in the winter and spring of 1974.
That January, the Political Union (ever the instigator of free speech crises on campus) invited
William Shockley to debate Roy Innis, the chairman of the Congress on Racial Equality. A
Stanford professor, Shockley made a name for himself touting racist genetic theories about the
mental inferiority of blacks.132 African-American and Hispanic student groups vowed to prevent
the Union’s debate from proceeding, using whatever means necessary.133 Their threats proved
premature: In a scene reminiscent of Wallace’s visit, the Union’s leadership voted to disinvite
both Innis and Shockley.
Shortly thereafter, a campus organ of the alumni society Lux et Veritas, Inc. reinvited
both men to New Haven, ostensibly to test the principles of free expression on Yale’s campus. In
an awkwardly hedged statement, Brewster defended the right of students to bring an offensive
speaker to campus, while simultaneously condemning LEVI’s “lack of sensitivity.”134 Claiming
an “atmosphere of intimidation” created by the president, the alumni organization canceled the
event. Yet another student group decided to host the debate in March, only to retract its plans
after receiving “threats emanating from members of the Yale Community.”135Finally, that April,
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Yale’s Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) chapter successfully brought Shockley to New
Haven, only for Shockley to be shouted down in the events described above.
Because of Shockley’s national infamy, Brewster found himself under attack for failing
to maintain a campus that respected the values of free speech. Conservative columnist and
prominent Yale graduate William F. Buckley, Jr. criticized Kingman for failing to protect YAF’s
debate from disruption. (Buckley may have been particularly sensitive to the affair because
Shockley’s debating partner, William Rusher, was the publisher of Buckley’s National
Review.)136 News outlets highlighted Yale’s seeming incivility compared to peer institutions:
Shockley had previously spoken, with no incident, at Princeton, Columbia, and Amherst.137
Senior professors at Yale were mutinous: distinguished faculty, including some of Kingman’s
confidants, demanded his unambiguous support of free speech.138* Those faculty’s worst fears
were confirmed when the university executive committee voted in May to allow twelve students
suspended for participating in the Shockley affair to return to campus that coming fall. It seemed
like the Wright Hall sit-in all over again — no serious penalties for disruption at Yale.
In the summer of 1974, Brewster was beleaguered. He faced dissention from alumni and
professors alike; the pragmatic approach that had prevented violence, starting with Wallace and
ending with May Day, made him appear unprincipled and weak. Jonathan Fanton, his special
assistant, recalled sharing one morose evening with his boss at Kingman’s summer home on
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Martha’s Vineyard. As the sun descended, Brewster smoked and mused about retiring — it
seemed he had lost the parliamentary majority needed to govern Yale effectively. By the end of
the conversation, night had fallen, and Fanton could only see a ghostly image of Kingman’s face,
outlined by the glowing tip of his cigar.139 In his moment of melancholy, Brewster turned to a
second faculty committee to reshape his image, one that crafted a renewed persona both for him
and for Yale.
*******
Chaired by historian C. Vann Woodward and composed of thirteen faculty and students,
the Committee on Freedom of Expression met in the fall term of 1974. Unlike Dahl’s Study
Group, which Brewster formed to address a variety of problems of which coeducation was but
one, Woodward’s committee possessed a single purpose: to reaffirm Yale’s commitment to the
intertwined issues of student discipline and free speech. And the group did just that, publishing
its report in the early days of 1975. That document addressed disruption and freedom of
expression in three sections. The first offered a philosophical defense of free speech and a
refutation of those who sought to squelch offending viewpoints through sit-ins, shout-downs, and
other disruptive tactics. In the eyes of the committee, the university should provide a space “to
think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable.”140 The
report summarily rejected those who “assert[ed] a right to prevent free expression,” and called
for “formal sanctions” against disrupters.141 The second section offered an historical overview of
disruption at Yale, from Governor Wallace through Shockley. The third proposed penalties for
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protestors who violated the rules: suspension or expulsion.142 Twelve of the thirteen committee
members signed the report; one student refused to join the majority and wrote a dissenting,
rambling manifesto that argued only “responsible” speech should be permitted inside a
university’s walls.143 The report was not groundbreaking: its disciplinary recommendations
conformed closely to the Brewster-scenario developed seven years before. However,
Woodward’s committee offered a seemingly fresh articulation of Yale’s values.
As he had with the Dahl committee, Kingman constructed the Committee on Freedom of
Expression with an intended result. He chose loyal faculty whom he knew would provide him
with a resounding and respected denunciation of student disruption. Chairman C. Vann
Woodward was a life-long advocate of free speech who openly despised the New Left’s coercive
tactics. Moreover, Woodward’s background as a prominent civil rights activist and esteemed
historian lent his committee’s report substantial legitimacy. Brewster also included among the
group Lloyd Cutler, an alumnus and ad hoc adviser, who protected the president’s personal
interests; Cutler forced the normally scrupulous Woodward to whitewash Brewster’s
involvement in embarrassing events. Finally, when the Committee on Freedom of Expression
produced its stirring defense of civility and order, Kingman advocated stricter penalties for
student disrupters than the committee itself had recommended. As a result of Woodward’s report
and his own political machinations, Brewster positioned himself to appear a firm disciplinarian,
despite the prior failures of the Brewster-scenario to protect both discipline and speech at Yale.
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In 1974, C. Vann Woodward was the most prominent scholar of southern history and one
of the pre-eminent American historians of all time.144 Colleagues at Yale saw him as “the most
distinguished faculty member” of a quite distinguished body.145 A quiet, aloof and often reserved
man, Woodward was born in Arkansas in 1908 and became a historian during the Great
Depression. He cut his teeth writing the history of the land below the Mason-Dixon line,
focusing on race, politics and the legacy of reconstruction. These topics did not endear him to his
fellow countrymen, who preferred to ignore their past and present injustices; Woodward would
later claim that these early years provided him the first glimpse of the importance of freedom of
speech.146
In the 1950s, while Woodward taught at Johns Hopkins, his close friend Owen Lattimore
was accused of disloyalty by the communist-hunting Senator Joseph McCarthy. Lattimore’s
persecution left a lasting mark on the southerner, who joined other Johns Hopkins faculty in
defending his colleague.147 In the student disrupters of the 1960s and early 1970s, C. Vann
Woodward saw a striking parallel to the McCarthyites. Both groups “justified the means they
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used by the ends they sought…The similarity lay in the curbing or denial of freedom of the
opposition.”148 Not shy about his views, Woodward was known among Yale’s faculty as a man
of “principles that were traditional, liberal, [and] democratic.”149 Yet it would be a mistake to
view him solely as a traditionalist. A staunch advocate of civil rights, Woodward combined
scholarship with activism, publishing books on the history of Jim Crow. When Woodward took
the reigns of the Committee on Free Expression, he was a widely respected member of the Yale
community with a reputation for defending tolerance in the academy.
But Brewster not only knew Woodward’s reputation; the president knew the historian
would firmly defend free speech at Yale. In the summer of 1974, Kingman offered Vann the
chairmanship of the committee. Woodward expressed reluctance. He was far from impartial. The
president remarked that Woodward’s past pronouncements in favor of free expression were of no
concern. The subtext: the university needed someone to reaffirm its most basic values after the
embarrassing Shockley incident. Woodward happily replied: “If you invoke the principles of free
speech, I will rise to the occasion and accept.”150 From its inception, the purpose of the
Woodward committee was clear: reassert the rules of Yale’s community against disruption.*
In addition to the southerner, Brewster packed the committee with his usual trusted
colleagues. Robert Dahl found a seat beside Woodward. Like Woodward, Dahl was not an
impartial adjudicator on the matter of student disruption, having written in support of free speech
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in Yale Daily News in the run-up to the Shockley affair.151 Kingman also appointed Harry
Wellington as a committee member. A prominent law professor, Wellington would be appointed
the dean of the Yale Law School in the midst of the committee’s proceedings. No one was more
faithful to the president, though, than Lloyd Cutler, a prominent Washington lawyer and alumnus
who was lecturing for a semester at his alma mater during the fall of 1974.152 By the time
Brewster appointed Cutler to the Woodward committee, the two men had developed an intimate
relationship: When in New Haven to teach, Cutler would sleep at the Brewsters’ official
residence. He had advised the president on coeducation, providing legal counsel on the failed
Vassar merger. Two years prior, in 1972, he wrote the centerpiece to a major fundraising
campaign, a document ambitiously titled “The Case for Yale.”153 From his experiences as an
informal aide and in his capacity as the alumni representative to the Woodward committee,
Cutler knew that Brewster needed to please moderates among the alumni estate.
Cutler played a crucial role in shaping the committee’s final report to reflect positively on
Yale’s president. C. Vann Woodward wrote the report’s second section, which traced the history
of disruption at Yale from 1963 to 1974.154 According to Philip Sirlin, then a student member of
the committee, Woodward presented a draft history to the group early in their proceedings. He
concluded that, for the past decade, Yale’s administration had not protected free speech nor
imposed discipline on unruly students. Upon reading the draft, Cutler confronted Woodward
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

151

Robert Dahl, “Shockley-Innis,” Yale Daily News, April 2, 1974, 2.
Cutler had previously served as the executive director on the National Commission on Violence, a federal
investigatory body that bridged the end of the Johnson administration and the start of Nixon’s tenure as president. In
arguably the first study to examine the 1960s as a phenomenon, the Commission examined the causes of violence
and social upheaval in America over the past decade. James Henry Shields, A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of
Records of the National Commission on Violence (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004), v-viii.
153
Lloyd Cutler, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, transcript, April 10, 1991, Griswold-Brewster History Project,
Box 4, Folder 54.
154
“Committee of the Freedom of Expression at Yale, Sub-Committees for drafting of final report,” November 24,
1974, C. Vann Woodward Papers, Series III, Box 85, Folder 5. Dahl drafted the first section, while Cutler and
Wellington drafted the third.
152

Zelinsky 44!
saying, “You can’t write this. If you write this, Kingman Brewster will have to resign.” Then, in
Sirlin’s words, the Washington lawyer “bullied Woodward” into rewriting the history. 155 The
nation’s most accomplished living historian caved to the pressure and agreed to massage the
past.156
Woodward’s final product reflected Cutler’s influence.157 His account of the Wallace
affair ignored Mayor Lee’s statement that the governor was unwelcome in New Haven. He
praised Brewster’s pragmatic approach for providing “stability” during periods of unrest.158
Although the committee privately discussed the Wright Hall fiasco as a milestone in the
university’s disciplinary policies (or lack thereof), Woodward failed to mention the incident in
his final draft.159 The historian cast May Day as an illustrious example of freedom of speech —
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despite Brewster having essentially canceled classes under the threat of violence.160 While the
report explored Kingman’s faults, Woodward pulled his punches.161
In the beginning of 1975, Woodward and the president submitted the first and third
sections of the report to the university faculty for ratification.162 Brewster added two addenda to
the report’s final recommendations: First, where the committee recommended that Yale’s
president might discourage (but not prohibit) a contentious speaker from coming to campus,
Kingman argued that such discouragement would be improper — despite having done just that
when he encouraged the Political Union to disinvite Wallace in 1963. Second, where the
Woodward committee proposed that disruptive students be subject to a disciplinary hearing,
Brewster advocated for automatic suspension, removing disciplinary decisions from the faculty’s
hands.163
In part, both of these modifications to Woodward’s report reflected Brewster’s past
experiences. Twice disappointed by faculty who refused to sanction disruptors in both the Wright
Hall and Shockley affairs, the president was no doubt reluctant to relive those experiences in the
future. And haunted by his actions with Wallace, he hoped to avoid further fallout from a similar
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situation. However, it is equally possible that Yale’s president offered these two measures to
appear “tough” on student misbehavior. By seeming even stricter than the stern Woodward,
Brewster repositioned himself as a model of a robust disciplinarian, firmly committed to resisting
lawlessness on campus.
The Woodward report was not revolutionary in its substance. The committee advocated
suspension or expulsion for student disrupters, the penalties already prescribed by the
university’s existing regulations.164 But, despite its lack of originality, the report seemed
groundbreaking. According to Woodward’s recollections, it “was certainly regarded as new.”
More importantly, though, “it was a forceful description of what was going to be policy, what the
purpose of the policy was, and what the purpose of the university was.”165 The report offered an
eloquent and appealing reaffirmation of how students should act that attracted schools around the
country. In a preface, Woodward framed his document in a national context: the university’s
problems “are shared by sister institutions at home and abroad;” he hoped that his report might
“inspire” other schools to similarly reaffirm their principles as citadels of free expression.166
Over the next few months, national press covered the report with enthusiasm, often
quoting the line that civil societies must be able to “think the unthinkable, discuss the
unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable.” The New York Times published two articles
describing the Woodward committee in detail and printed a long excerpt from the philosophical
first section.167 When Richard Nixon’s former press secretary Ronald Ziegler was disinvited
from Boston University that February, the paper quoted C. Vann Woodward in its editorials
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supporting Ziegler’s right to speak.168 The Chicago Tribune, the Los Angles Times, and others
heralded the report as a must-read for all academics.169 Even the committee’s detractors admitted
that its product was “lofty.”170 Through Woodward, Brewster presented Yale to the public as a
seeming bastion of civility and free speech.171
*******
Historians have a difficult time categorizing the 1970s, often compressing it into either
the end of the prior decade or the start of the succeeding one. Many speak of the long Sixties,
with a capital “S,” a “decade” that culminates in 1974 with the Watergate scandal and Richard
Nixon’s resignation. In this narrative, the Sixties were a period of radicalism in politics and
culture, on both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum.172 Lately, scholars have
investigated the transnational aspect of that social upheaval, placing America’s trials in a global
framework.173 And there is an equally clear understanding, though less thoroughly researched, of
the 1980s — a time of conservative revival, Ronald Reagan, and the end of the Cold War.174
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From this vantage point, the last years of the 1970s were nothing more than the doldrums of
popular discontent from which the Reagan Revolution sprang.
Recently, scholars have begun to reevaluate the 1970s as a decade in and of its own right,
more than merely the death throes of the long Sixties or the birth pangs of 1980s. In a typical
overview of the decade, an aptly titled Something Happened, Edward Berkowitz argues that
indeed something distinct did happen in the 1970s: the post-war consensus finally collapsed as
increasingly divisive debates, such as those over women’s rights and gay rights, embroiled the
nation.175 To him and other historians, the decade embodied a rejection of existing norms and
authorities and a search for a replacement of the status quo.176 Daniel Rodgers builds on this
conclusion in Age of Fracture. For Rodgers, the 1970s was a moment in which “Americans tried
to reimagine themselves and their society” through intellectual and ideological wars across a
“half-dozen fronts.”177 The result was a society that emphasized individuals over institutions, the
personal over the communal.
An understudied discipline, the study of higher education lags behind its peer sub-fields
within history in analyzing the 1970s.178 For the few historians who do tackle the decade in the
context of universities, most interpretations focus on the effects of a macro-economy troubled by
oil shocks on institutions of learning. Shrinking endowments, declining enrollments, and fiscal
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shortfalls preoccupied administrators’ time.179 This analysis conforms to what participants
themselves remembered. Kingman Brewster remarked that as the 1970s began, his focus shifted
“from law and order to balancing the budget.”180 Others had difficulty categorizing the decade at
Yale. For Jonathan Fanton, after the early 1970s, Brewster and Yale lacked a “clear…agenda.”181
But in hindsight, a different picture emerges of Yale and America’s campuses more
broadly in the 1970s. The Dahl and Woodward committees reveal a period of redefinition and
reaffirmation in higher education — a conclusion at odds with the one Rodgers describes in Age
of Fracture. The unruly 1960s led Brewster to adopt pragmatism to govern effectively. A
cautious approach toward coeducation mollified cantankerous alumni whose support he needed.
And often ceding to the threat of violence and disruption — or at least seeming to cave to these
pressures — Brewster preserved the university from erupting into a conflagration of unrest. Yale
survived the 1960s virtually unscathed because of his pragmatism.
At the onset of the 1970s the twin stresses of unruly alumni and student estates subsided.
Absent the challenges of radicalism, Brewster’s pragmatism seemed both weak and extreme: His
vow for “one thousand male leaders a year” committed him to preserving a male dominated
Yale. And, in failing to quell disruptive students, he appeared unable to maintain order on
campus. With the two committees, Brewster found a way to redefine himself and his university.
In the Study Group on Yale College, he shed his promises to the alumni and expanded the
definition of who could become part of the Yale community. With the Committee on Freedom of
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Expression, he successfully recast his reputation as a soft disciplinarian and established firm
standards for how students should behave.
In these two cases, Yale’s president sought to codify who should be a part of the Yale
community and how those community members should act. For some, like Elga Wasserman,
there was a clear relationship between the first codification of Yale’s admissions and the second
codification of its norms. The need to articulate rules was an unintended consequence of the
demographically changing student body: The new women on campus did not “buy into all of the
established norms” because they felt rejected by the existing “Yale tradition.”182 Brewster thus
first invited new types of undergraduates onto the university playground and then told them the
rules of the game. Far from being an age of a fracturing society as Rodgers might have us think,
the 1970s at Yale were more aptly titled the age of codification, when Brewster reformulated the
boundaries of the university community.183
The Dahl Committee and the Woodward Committee were born in a moment of selfreflection at Yale. Yet far from parochial, they were part of larger national conversations about
the role of the university in society — an academic conversation in turn based in a nation’s
search for itself. The Study Group echoed the Carnegie Commission and others who sought to
redefine the landscape of higher education for a modern era. The Committee on Freedom of
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Expression was a national conversation in its own right, analyzed and cited by popular
commentators as a watershed moment in academia.
The results of Brewster’s committees have proved durable: Today’s Yale undergraduates
are evenly split between men and women.184 Woodward’s report remains the university’s official
policy on freedom of expression.185 With the final score tallied, Yale’s president successfully
rehabilitated his reputation and created new rules for the university. But the question remains:
What did Brewster truly believe? Were the policies of gender inclusivity and free expression that
Brewster championed with the Woodward and Dahl committees his true beliefs? Or were these
committees simply pragmatic ways to extricate himself from two politically untenable stances?
One of Brewster’s colleagues once remarked that the president “could live gracefully with
ambiguity. He understood ambiguity. He understood the complexity of things.”186 Today, it
remains ambiguous what exact combination of realism and idealism motivated Brewster. In
many ways, this conclusion echoes F. Scott Fitzgerald’s dictum that “the sign of a first rate
intellect is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time and still function.”
Brewster was that type of intellect.187
In part, though, Brewster only articulated his vision for Yale — in the precise way that he
did and at the time that he did — because he was forced to. Without the twin stimuli of alumni
unrest and student disruption, along with the resulting backlash of staid faculty and Yale
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184

“Yale Factsheet,” last modified 2013, http://oir.yale.edu/yale-factsheet.
“Undergraduate Regulations,” last modified 2013, http://yalecollege.yale.edu/content/undergraduate-regulations.
Admittedly, Yale did not always adhere to the ideals of the Woodward Report. In 1986, a Yale student named
Wayne Dick was disciplined for posting an anonymous flyer mocking gay and lesbian students. The executive
committee that admonished him paradoxically cited the Woodward Report in it’s ruling. The following semester, C.
Vann Woodward heard about Dick’s case and acted as the student’s faculty advocate at a hearing which overturned
the previous sanction. The incident created a national stir — Woodward himself wrote an op-ed on the importance
of free speech in the New York Times. For a basic account of the Wayne Dick affair, see Hentoff, Free Speech, 118131.
186
Wilkinson, interview by Geoffrey Kabaservice, May 19, 1992.
187
F. Scott Fitzgerald, My Lost City: Personal Essays, 1920-1940 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
139.
185

!

Zelinsky 52!
graduates, Kingman Brewster may never have so coherently reformulated the university. From
this vantage point, the crucible of the 1960s had an unintended consequence in the 1970s. Unrest
caused leaders in the field of higher education, such as Brewster, to define the boundaries and
norms of their academic monarchies. In challenging the university administration, students and
alumni seem to have ironically bolstered it.
The particular crises that Brewster confronted are unlikely to reoccur. Even at the height
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, college campuses were mostly calm and peaceful — a far
cry from the 9,400 separate protests at universities in the 1969-1970 academic year. It is
similarly improbable that unhappy alumni will form well-funded groups, like Lux et Veritas, Inc,
to protest policies at their almae matres. But future challenges in higher education will certainly
arise, and modern administrators can look to Brewster’s example — an example of how to
navigate movements of upheaval and regain course after the storm passes.
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Bibliographic Essay
Writing the essay I had in mind necessitated delving into three different subjects: The
histories of Yale, university governance generally, and the 1970s broadly. Each of those subfields presented unique challenges: At the moment, scholarship on the 1970s is in transition, with
a burgeoning body of new work appearing. Few historians have written about the history of
higher education, and even fewer have focused on this time period. And almost no one has
examined Yale University in the 1970s.
Because Yale is at the heart of the story I wanted to tell, I first tackled the existing
literature on the university and its president. Geoffrey Kabaservice’s The Guardians is the only
study that covers Kingman Brewster’s administration — and even he tells Brewster’s story
alongside those of fellow liberal elites, including such greats as McGeorge Bundy, John Lindsay,
and Cyrus Vance. In his portrayal of how these wealthy Yale graduates governed the country,
Kabaservice led me to see Brewster as a pragmatist, someone willing to simultaneously
champion old and new ideas in order to survive the 1960s. But I also found Kabaservice’s thesis
wrapped up in a declensionist narrative that idealizes the liberal elite and their moment in power.
He mourns the tragic fall of the eastern Republicans with the election of Richard Nixon. This
narrative forces him to mold Brewster’s life into a downfall shortly after 1968 — because just as
McGeorge Bundy left the White House, Brewster needed to face similar failures to fit into
Kabaservice’s narrative arc. The Guardians thus ends with the events of May Day 1970 and
concludes that, after 1971, Brewster was an ineffective president.
To fill in the ensuing seven years of Brewster’s presidency that Kabaservice largely
ignores, I turned to three types of primary sources: living participants, past oral history, and
various university records in the Sterling Library.
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I was lucky to have repeated access to Henry “Sam” Chauncey, Jr., who provided me
with an invaluable perspective on Yale in the Brewster years. From his time as the president’s
special assistant and later the university’s secretary, Chauncey was at the center of this story.
Numerous conversations with Chauncey helped me narrow my topic to the Dahl and Woodward
committees specifically, identifying the intricate problems that Kingman faced in the 1960s and
1970s. (I had previously written a short paper on the Dahl committee in Jay Gitlin’s Yale an
America seminar, in which Chauncey’s recollections proved useful.) Later in my research
process, I benefited from speaking with professors Donald Kagan and Gaddis Smith, both of
whom were involved in issues of free speech, Kagan as a conservative provocateur in the faculty
and Smith as an administrator. I also was fortunate to speak with three surviving members of the
two committees. Of those, Philip Sirlin offered the most unexpected bombshell: that C. Vann
Woodward had redacted his history of free expression at Yale at the behest of Lloyd Cutler.
While I could not verify Sirlin’s account with independent evidence, I am fairly confident in his
sincerity.
The transcripts of interviews conducted in the Griswold-Brewster Oral History Project
supplied access to those I could not meet today. Geoffrey Kabaservice conducted these
interviews in 1991 and 1992, and the project provided the material for much of his book.
Because of my interest in the 1970s, I was not simply retreading ground covered in The
Guardians, but was instead focusing on previously unpublished material. A phone conversation
with Kabaservice helped indentify some transcripts of unexpected importance that I would not
have otherwise seen. In two cases, with Chauncey and Kagan, the transcripts allowed me to
refine the focus of my own interviews with each man. In the unfortunate case of Robert Dahl, the
interview included nothing about the Dahl Committee — Kabaservice had intended to conduct a
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follow-up interview, but never did. Typically, most of the Griswold-Brewster Oral History
Project stayed at the surface level; the various participants in Brewster’s Yale painted the
university and its culture in broad strokes.
Eight separate collections of university records provided the specificity that the oral
history lacked. The voluminous minutes of the Dahl Committee provided a moment-by-moment
account of each meeting. The Woodward Committee’s records proved similarly detailed, if
slightly less lengthy. For my purposes, the internal deliberations of the committees were only
important when they intersected Brewster’s campus politics, and I tended not to cite them in my
final product. Instead, I relied on other collections, including the papers of Wasserman’s office
and the extensive records of the office of the president. In one case, the internal records
pertaining to Lux et Veritas, Inc., I successfully petitioned the university to unseal the
documents, which were otherwise restricted. In the process of my research, I stumbled across a
number of anecdotes that corrected the existing historical record — for instance, that Brewster’s
speech at May Day contained a passionate exhortation for the university to remain open in
addition to his comments about the Seale trial.
Despite my wealth of sources, what I most lacked at the end of the day was Kingman
Brewster in his own words, be they personal letters or diaries. An introverted and somewhat shy
man, Brewster fittingly left behind few windows into his innermost private thoughts. Parts of this
paper, particularly the section on the Dahl Committee, rely on inference to deduce his intentions.
Happily, I could peer into another closed mind, that of C. Vann Woodward. John
Roper’s biography of the southern historian provided the basic outlines of Woodward’s life and
scholarship, though Roper offered surprisingly little information about Woodward’s commitment
to free expression. Woodward’s personal papers at Yale led me to examine his relationship with
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civil-libertarian Howard Beale, his unpublished writings on free speech, and his friendship with
Donald Kagan. Later in the process, I was also fortunate enough to receive an advanced copy of
Michael O’Brien’s forthcoming edited collection of Woodward’s letters, which led me to
correspondence that I would not have otherwise seen. While much of this material did not find
its way directly into my paper, I hope that my analysis of Woodward’s principles and how he
may have airbrushed history to protect Brewster adds to the growing attention that surrounds one
of America’s greatest historians.
The next challenge to my paper was the lack of historians studying higher education.
Because most universities possess dedicated education departments, studies of American
universities are typically written by social scientists interested in the present landscape of higher
education or non-academic polemicists who lack the pretense of objectivity. Additionally, the
history of higher education is best written through the lens of a single institution. However, in the
current academic climate, scholars view institutional histories as hobbies, not serious
accomplishments. In the 1950s, Yale professor George Pierson wrote a definitive two-volume
history of the university and numerous similar books, feats that earned him distinction within his
scholarly community. Today, Pierson’s professional path is inconceivable. As a result, cultural
and political historians generally avoid higher education — both because they lack a home in
most schools’ departments and their scholarship may not lead to career advancement.
There are three broad exceptions to this trend: First, some historians have traced how the
Cold War led to an alliance between the American government, which needed to maintain a
technological edge over the Soviets, and research universities happy to accept government
monies. Second, some aspects of higher education can be found in other sub-fields, such as the
general scholarship surrounding social unrest of the 1960s. Martha Biondi’s The Black
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Revolution on Campus is a good such example. Third, a few scholars have defied the trend and
have written accomplished overviews of higher education. While slightly out of date, The
American College and University by Frederick Rudolph traces the evolution of post-secondary
education from colonial times to the 1960s. Rudolph led me to consider the growing role of
alumni in university governance after the Civil War, the birth of the modern academic
bureaucracy at the turn of the century, and the relationship between the larger American culture
and its universities. I also hugely benefited from Jerome Karabel’s tour-de-force study of
admissions policies at Harvard, Yale and Princeton. While I disagree with Karabel’s portrayal of
the Dahl Committee as at-odds with Brewster’s wishes, The Chosen provided a well-researched
back-story of coeducation at Yale situated within the context of American culture. More
recently, Christopher Loss’ Between Citizens and the State traces the relationship between
institutions of higher learning and government in the twentieth century. In examining the role of
universities as political battlegrounds, he shows how campuses in the 1970s were at the center of
the culture-wars.
In many ways, Loss suffers from a symptom of scholarship on the 1970s more broadly:
He elides that decade with the 1960s, choosing to view American culture through the lens of the
“long Sixties.” Extending the incredibly tumultuous 1960s into the 1970s leads him to
overestimate the extent of strife on campuses in the second period. This led to my final
challenge: how to view the 1970s? In eschewing the concept of the long Sixties, I am not
attempting to re-write the mountain of scholarship that employs this frame of analysis. Instead, I
wanted to illustrate how a different perspective on the decade leads to a different understanding
of the 1970s and universities at the time. As Loss, Karabel, Rudolph and others have admirably
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demonstrated, college campuses provide a window into American culture. If we use that window
but abandon the long Sixties, what do we see about America?
In asking this question, I was aided by Daniel Rodgers’ Age of Fracture. Unlike Edward
Berkowitz’s Something Happened, Rodgers focuses heavily on ideas, not events. In doing so, he
studies America’s search for identity through the intersection of the cultural and the political — a
similar intersection of people and their thoughts that make university campuses a dynamic slice
of society to analyze. What I found at Yale complicates Rodgers’ conclusion of fractured
individualism, though admittedly Rodgers’ frame of reference often extends into the 1980s and
1990s. Through Dahl and Woodward, Brewster codified norms and boundaries for his
community that the campus and the broader country respected. Does this overturn Rodgers
thesis? No. But it adds a dimension to the 1970s as a time of consensus building on college
campuses that both he and Loss miss for different reasons.
I am grateful to a number of people for their help this past year. Thank you to my adviser,
Professor Jay Gitlin, for allowing me to kibitz in his office far too much. To Sam Chauncey, for
providing a backboard off of which to bounce many thoughts. To Professor Michael O’Brien,
who graciously offered me a copy of his book, despite the fact that I could not yet articulate my
thesis. I also owe a debt to the people who lent me their time and allowed me to interview them.
Finally, thank you to those who read my drafts, especially the staunch few who looked for typos.

